Repository | Zeitschrift | Band | Artikel

270036

The problem of the foundation of knowledge in Rickert, Husserl, and Weber

Paul Slama(Université de Namur)

pp. 467-512

Abstrakt

In this article, we bring the thought of Edmund Husserl and Max Weber into dialogue with that of Heinrich Rickert. Both Husserl and Weber argue that Rickert remained committed to a form of formalism that was excessively detached—according to Husserl, from the intuitiveness of the Lebenswelt (lifeworld), and according to Weber, from historical realities and from the limitations of the knowing subject. Building upon this critique, we show how Husserl and Weber each developed a method of variation—eidetic variation in the former case, ideal-typical variation in the latter—in order to account for the concrete dimension of knowledge that formalism fails to capture. The aim of this article is to elucidate three distinct conceptions of subjectivity: Rickert’s, oriented toward transcendent values yet ultimately grounded in morality as a norm within the subject; Husserl’s, entirely immanent, discovering within itself—without producing it—the structure of objectivity through a process of possibilization; and Weber’s, likewise immanent and similarly constituted through possibilization, but only in an ideal-typical sense, within the bounds of an irreducible finitude linked to the crisis of modern reason.

Publication details

Published in:

de Santis Daniele, Quepons Ignacio (2026) Transcendental phenomenology, the idea of philosophy and the foundation of science II. Metodo 13 (2).

Seiten: 467-512

DOI: 10.19079/metodo.13.2.467

Referenz:

Slama Paul (2026) „The problem of the foundation of knowledge in Rickert, Husserl, and Weber“. Metodo 13 (2), 467–512.