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Una fondazione fenomenologica per la logica del giudizio di Brentano
pp. 239-276
Abstrakt
In his Psychology from empirical standpoint (1874), Brentano argued that the science of psychology must serve both as the pinnacle and the foundation of all other scientific enquiries, including the logical one concerning his own theory of judgment. Brentano was indeed correct in his assumption of the necessity of some sort of foundation; however, in contrast to his view, it is my intention to demonstrate that this foundation cannot be found in his psychology. It is rather phenomenology, as outlined by his pupil Husserl, that has the potential to provide a foundation for all scientific disciplines and therefore for Brentano’s logical theory of judgment as well. The aim of the following pages is, hence, to challenge Brentano’s perspective by arguing for the necessity of phenomenology to take the place of psychology. It is my contention that providing a phenomenological foundation for Brentano’s theory of judgment may prove helpful in addressing one of the main issues that arise from its strong psychological roots. To accomplish this, it is also essential to rehabilitate logic, which Brentano regarded as merely an organon in an Aristotelian sense, as a science in its own right.
Publication details
Published in:
de Santis Daniele, Quepons Ignacio (2026) Transcendental phenomenology, the idea of philosophy and the foundation of science II. Metodo 13 (2).
Seiten: 239-276
Referenz:
Maffettone Francesca (2026) „Una fondazione fenomenologica per la logica del giudizio di Brentano“. Metodo 13 (2), 239–276.




