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Underdetermination and theory preference
pp. 145-165
Abstrakt
Let us begin by reviewing the main results of the previous chapter. It was argued that, provided certain conditions are met, we can construct a purely probabilistic inference to some scientific realist claims. To recap, it was argued that we are justified in adopting realism with respect to some theory T if:
Publication details
Published in:
Wright John (2018) An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: defending realism without inference to the best explanation. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 145-165
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1_6
Referenz:
Wright John (2018) Underdetermination and theory preference, In: An epistemic foundation for scientific realism, Dordrecht, Springer, 145–165.