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Why perception is not singular reference
pp. 111-120
Abstrakt
Charles Chastain has developed a general notion of singular reference based on the reference relation a singular term bears to its referent.1 He holds that perception is, in this broad sense, a kind of reference. Subtleties aside, he holds that one perceives something if and only if one has a sense experience that refers to it.2 This account of perception plays a central role in his framework for a theory of reference: Perceptual reference is, he holds, the primary way that referential chains are initiated.
Publication details
Published in:
Heil John (1989) Cause, mind, and reality: essays honoring C. B. Martin. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 111-120
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DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_8
Referenz:
(1989) „Why perception is not singular reference“, In: J. Heil (ed.), Cause, mind, and reality, Dordrecht, Springer, 111–120.




